|This centre is a member of The LSE Research Laboratory [RLAB]: CASE | CVER | CEP | SERC | STICERD||Cookies?|
Christian A. L.
Paper No' SERCDP0038: | Full paper
Save Reference as: BibTeX File | EndNote Import File
Keywords: Land use regulations; zoning, land ownership, housing supply
JEL Classification: H7; Q15; R52
Is hard copy/paper copy available? YES - Paper Copy Still In Print.
This Paper is published under the following series: SERC Discussion Papers
Share this page: Google Bookmarks | Facebook | Twitter
Abstract:We model residential land use constraints as the outcome of a political economy game between owners of developed and owners of undeveloped land. Land use constraints benefit the former group (via increasing property prices) but hurt the latter (via increasing development costs). More desirable locations are more developed and, as a consequence of political economy forces, more regulated. Using an IV approach that directly follows from our model we find strong and robust support for our predictions. The data provide weak or no support for alternative hypotheses whereby regulations reflect the wishes of the majority of households or efficiency motives.
Copyright © RLAB & LSE 2003 - 2019 | LSE, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE | Contact: RLAB | Site updated 20 October 2019