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Abstract for:

The dilemma of central bank transparency

Stephen  Hansen,  Michael  McMahon,  Andrea  Prat,  January 2015
Paper No' CEPCP439: | Full paper (pdf)
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Keywords: Monetary policy, deliberation, FOMC, transparency, career concerns

JEL Classification: E52; E58; D78

Is hard copy/paper copy available? YES - Paper Copy Still In Print.
This Paper is published under the following series: CentrePiece Magazine
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If central banks publish the transcripts of their internal policy debates, will discussions be enhanced or inhibited? Michael McMahon and colleagues use tools from computational linguistics to analyse the positive and negative effects of transparency on deliberations of the monetary policymakers at the US Federal Reserve.

CentrePiece 19 (3) Winter2015 pages: 21-23

This article summarises ‘Transparency and Deliberation within the FOMC: a Computational Linguistics Approach’ by Stephen Hansen, Michael McMahon and Andrea Prat, CEP Discussion Paper No.1276, June 2014.

This paper has been published as:
'Transparency and Deliberation within the FOMC: A Computational Linguistics Approach', Stephen Hansen, Michael McMahon and Andrea Prat, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 133, Issue 2, May 2018