|This centre is a member of The LSE Research Laboratory [RLAB]: CASE | CVER | CEP | SERC | STICERD||Cookies?|
Paper No' CEPDP1034: | Full paper
Save Reference as: BibTeX File | EndNote Import File
Keywords: Communal responsibility; anonymous matching, money demand, credit, bills of exchange
JEL Classification: E41; D51; N2
Is hard copy/paper copy available? YES - Paper Copy Still In Print.
This Paper is published under the following series: CEP Discussion Papers
Share this page: Google Bookmarks | Facebook | Twitter
Abstract:Communal responsibility, a medieval institution studied by Greif (2006), supported the use of credit among European merchants in the absence of modern enforcement technologies. This paper shows how this mechanism helps to overcome enforcement problems in anonymous buyer/seller transactions. In a village economy version of the Lagos and Wright (2005) model, agents trading anonymously in decentralized markets can be identified by their citizenship and thus be held liable for each other. Enforceability within each village's centralized afternoon market ensures collateralization of credit in decentralized markets. In the resulting equilibrium, money and credit coexist in decentralized markets if the use of credit is costly. Our analysis easily extends itself to other payment systems like credit cards that provide a group identity to otherwise anonymous agents.
Copyright © RLAB & LSE 2003 - 2017 | LSE, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE | Contact: RLAB | Site updated 21 September 2017