Abstract for:

Bank Bailouts, International Linkages and Cooperation

Friederike  Niepmann,  Tim  Schmidt-Eisenlohr,  November 2010
Paper No' CEPDP1023: | Full paper (pdf)
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Keywords: Portfolio choice; international transmission of shocks, monetary policy

JEL Classification: F31; F41

Is hard copy/paper copy available? YES - Paper Copy Still In Print.
This Paper is published under the following series: CEP Discussion Papers
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Abstract:

Financial institutions are increasingly linked internationally. As a result, financial crisis and government intervention have stronger effects beyond borders. We provide a model of international contagion allowing for bank bailouts. While a social planner trades off tax distortions, liquidation losses and intra- and intercountry income inequality, in the noncooperative game between governments there are inefficiencies due to externalities, no burden sharing and free-riding. We show that, in absence of cooperation, stronger interbank linkages make government interests diverge, whereas cross-border asset holdings tend to align them. We analyze different forms of cooperation and their effects on global and national welfare.