Abstract for:

Political Competition, Policy and Growth: Theory and Evidence from the United States

Timothy  Besley,  Torsten  Persson,  Daniel M.  Sturm,  October 2010
Paper No' CEPDP1009: | Full paper (pdf)
Save Reference as: BibTeX BibTeX File | Endote EndNote Import File
Keywords: political competition; competition, government, US, economic development

JEL Classification: D72; H11; H70; N12; O11

Is hard copy/paper copy available? YES - Paper Copy Still In Print.
This Paper is published under the following series: CEP Discussion Papers
Share this page: Google Bookmarks Google Bookmarks | Facebook Facebook | Twitter Twitter


This paper develops a simple model to analyze how a lack of political competition may lead to policies that hinder economic growth. We test the predictions of the model on panel data for the US states. In these data, we find robust evidence that lack of political competition in a state is associated with anti-growth policies: higher taxes, lower capital spending and a reduced likelihood of using right-to-work laws. We also document a strong link between low political competition and low income growth.